





Available, Granted, Revoked:  
A New Framework for Assessing 
Unauthorized Access Under the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act 
Samuel Kane† 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) criminalizes a broad range of 
conduct related to the compromise of computer systems. Specifically, the CFAA pro-
hibits unauthorized access to computer systems, defining such access as that which 
occurs “without authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized access.” 
Courts interpreting the meaning of unauthorized access under the CFAA have di-
verged into two camps. On one side, proponents of the broad approach argue that 
the CFAA unauthorized access inquiry should focus on access purpose, assessing 
whether a given access was conducted for a purpose authorized by the computer 
owner. On the other side, proponents of the narrow approach argue that the relevant 
inquiry should instead be permission focused, looking only at whether the computer 
owner had granted the accesser permission to access the computer (without regard 
for why the computer was accessed). 
This Comment proposes a three-step framework for assessing CFAA unauthor-
ized access that will resolve the present circuit split. Leveraging concepts from CFAA 
case law and offering applicability across a wide range of factual and technological 
contexts, this Comment’s Available-Granted-Revoked (AGR) Framework sequen-
tially evaluates (1) whether the computer in question is publicly available or private; 
(2) whether the computer’s owner had, at any point, granted the accesser permission 
to access the computer; and (3) whether the computer owner had affirmatively re-
voked the accesser’s permission, if any, prior to the purportedly unauthorized access. 
By adopting the Available-Granted-Revoked Framework, courts will be able to effec-
tively advance the interests underlying both sides of the current circuit split and 
bring clarity to a persistent legal ambiguity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act1 (CFAA) is the federal 
government’s leading computer crime statute, criminalizing a 
broad range of conduct related to the compromise of computer sys-
tems.2 Specifically, the CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to 
computer systems, defining such access as that which occurs 
“without authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized 
access.”3 Simple, right? Not quite. Let’s consider a few examples. 
Jim is a computer hacker who hacks into the Alpha Com-
pany’s database and steals valuable company information. Under 
the CFAA, this case would be straightforward: Jim’s actions 
would almost certainly constitute access of a computer “without 
authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized access.” 
Easy. 
But let’s alter the facts. Suppose Jim is not a hacker, but an 
Alpha employee. Let’s further suppose that Alpha has given Jim 
access to the database as part of his work duties. Jim decides to 
quit his job at Alpha, but not before downloading a folder of sen-
sitive company information and forwarding it to the Beta Com-
pany, Alpha’s chief competitor. Has Jim violated the CFAA? He 
certainly had access to the database, but did he have authoriza-
tion when he accessed it for the purpose of sending Alpha’s sensi-
tive information to Beta? What if he quit his job, but then ac-
cessed the database six months later, using his old login 
credentials? Different result? 
Let’s complicate things further by taking our hypothetical out 
of the employment context. Suppose Alpha has made its database 
publicly available, accessible to anyone with an Internet connec-
tion. Jim is a Beta employee and uses a software tool to scrape 
data from the public database for Beta’s business uses. Did Jim 
engage in CFAA unauthorized access? The database was publicly 
available, but does it “exceed authorized access” to run an auto-
mated scraper against that information? 
As the above examples illustrate, the issue of CFAA unau-
thorized access is surprisingly complicated, and it is one that 
courts have struggled to resolve in the decades since the statute’s 
enactment. Generally speaking, courts have divided into a two-
sided circuit split. Proponents of the “broad approach”—looking 
 
 1 Pub L No 99-474, 100 Stat 1213 (1986), codified as amended at 18 USC § 1030. 
 2 See 18 USC § 1030. 
 3 See 18 USC § 1030(a), (e)(6) (defining “exceeds authorized access”). 
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to enhance the ability of computer owners to protect their sys-
tems—posit that the CFAA unauthorized access inquiry should 
focus on access purpose, determining whether a given access was 
conducted for a purpose authorized by the computer owner.4 
Meanwhile, proponents of the “narrow approach”—concerned 
about the CFAA becoming an overbroad vehicle for criminal lia-
bility—have argued that the relevant inquiry should instead be 
permission focused, looking only at whether the owner had 
granted the accesser permission to access the computer (without 
regard for why that computer was accessed).5 
Underlying much of the confusion surrounding the CFAA’s 
unauthorized access provisions is the assumption that this circuit 
split is fundamentally irreconcilable. In other words, courts must 
choose to advance the interests of either the broad approach’s  
purpose-focused inquiry or the narrow approach’s permission-fo-
cused inquiry. 
This Comment rejects that assumption. Instead, it articu-
lates a novel framework that will allow courts to assess CFAA 
unauthorized access in a manner that protects the interests pri-
oritized by both the broad and narrow approaches. Leveraging 
concepts from CFAA case law and offering applicability across a 
wide range of factual and technological contexts, this Comment’s 
Available-Granted-Revoked (AGR) Framework sequentially eval-
uates (1) whether the computer in question is publicly available 
or private; (2) whether the computer’s owner had, at any point, 
granted the accesser permission to access the computer; and 
(3) whether the computer owner had affirmatively revoked the ac-
cesser’s permission, if any, prior to the purportedly unauthorized 
access. 
This approach serves the interests underlying both the broad 
and narrow approaches. By limiting the scope of the CFAA’s un-
authorized access provisions to private computers (via Step 1) 
and adopting a permission-focused inquiry in Steps 2 and 3, the 
Framework will help to restrain the scope of CFAA liability—a 
key aim of narrow-approach advocates. At the same time, by al-
lowing computer owners to terminate access authorization by af-
firmatively revoking permission (via Step 3), the Framework will 
advance the broad-approach goal of allowing computer owners to 
protect their systems. 
 
 4 See Part II.B for additional discussion of the broad approach. 
 5 See Part II.C for additional discussion of the narrow approach. 
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This Comment proceeds in three parts: Part I provides an 
overview of the CFAA, focusing in particular on the statute’s un-
authorized access provisions. Part II summarizes the current cir-
cuit split regarding how broadly or narrowly the CFAA’s unau-
thorized access provisions should be defined. Finally, Part III 
describes the AGR Framework, applies it to several example 
cases, and evaluates its benefits and drawbacks. 
I.  OVERVIEW: THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT (CFAA) 
Contemporary discussions surrounding the scope of the 
CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions are primarily rooted in 
debates about what problem(s) Congress intended the CFAA to 
address and what the statute’s text means. Accordingly, Part I.A 
describes the historical backdrop against which Congress enacted 
the CFAA, and Part I.B offers a high-level summary of the 
CFAA’s key provisions. 
A. Historical Background and Enactment 
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed growing public con-
cern about the criminal justice system’s ability to address com-
puter crime. Prior to this period, computer-related crimes were 
typically prosecuted under traditional property-crime frame-
works.6 However, commentators criticized this approach, with 
many observers highlighting the difficulties of applying tradi-
tional theft, burglary, and trespass concepts in the digital con-
text.7 Moreover, the 1970s saw rising levels of public and private 
computer usage, as well as the entry of computer hackers into the 
cultural mainstream, further highlighting the property-crime ap-
proach’s shortcomings.8 
Acting against this backdrop, Congress enacted the CFAA in 
1984,9 framing it as a response to the inability of existing legal 
 
 6 See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in 
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 NYU L Rev 1596, 1605–13 (2003). 
 7 See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, HR Rep No 99-612, 99th Cong, 2d 
Sess 5 (1986) (noting that computer data “does not fit well into traditional categories of 
property”); Kerr, 78 NYU L Rev at 1613–15 (cited in note 6) (summarizing criticisms of 
the property-crime approach to addressing computer crime). 
 8 See HR Rep No 99-612 at 4–6 (cited in note 7). Several commentators have also 
highlighted the role that the 1983 Matthew Broderick film WarGames played in raising 
public awareness of computer hacking. See Jonathan Mayer, Cybercrime Litigation, 164 
U Pa L Rev 1453, 1458 n 14 (2016) (collecting sources). 
 9 See United States v Valle, 807 F3d 508, 525 (2d Cir 2015). The Act was initially 
passed as the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, then 
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frameworks to adequately address the growing computer-crime 
problem.10 While it is unclear precisely what the bill’s drafters 
viewed as the parameters of computer crime, the congressional 
reports accompanying the 1984 Act and its 1986 amendments 
specifically focused on the threat computer hackers posed.11 For 
instance, these reports described the Act as prohibiting the com-
puter equivalent of “breaking and entering,”12 and illustrated the 
severity of the computer-crime problem by describing incidents 
involving hackers breaking into computer systems containing fi-
nancial information and hospital records.13 These reports thus 
make clear that, at minimum, Congress intended the CFAA to 
address the threat of computer hackers. 
B. Statutory Overview 
The CFAA criminalizes a range of conduct generally related 
to the compromise of computer systems and offers a civil remedy 
for entities impacted by such conduct.14 Most notably, the Act pro-
hibits certain unauthorized access of computers, a concept that 
encompasses both access “without authorization” and access in a 
manner that “exceeds authorized access.”15 
The CFAA defines “computer” broadly, encompassing any 
“electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high 
 
amended by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. See Kerr, 78 NYU L Rev at 1598 
n 11 (cited in note 6). Several states passed similar laws during this time period as well. 
See id at 1615–16. 
 10 See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, HR Rep 
No 98-894, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 8–10 (1984). 
 11 See, for example, id at 10–12; HR Rep No 99-612 at 5–7 (cited in note 7). 
 12 HR Rep No 98-894 at 20 (cited in note 10). 
 13 See HR Rep No 99-612 at 6 (cited in note 7) (financial records); Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-432, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 2–3 (1986) (hospital records). 
 14 See generally 18 USC § 1030. 
 15 See, for example, 18 USC § 1030(a)(1)–(2), (4) (prohibiting access both “without 
authorization” and in a manner that “exceeds authorized access” in a range of contexts). 
Though unauthorized access can be fairly characterized as the CFAA’s primary focus, it is 
not the only activity the statute prohibits. See, for example, 18 USC § 1030(a)(5)(A) (pro-
hibiting one from “knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code, 
or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage . . . to a pro-
tected computer”); 18 USC § 1030(a)(6) (prohibiting the trafficking of stolen passwords); 
18 USC § 1030(a)(7) (prohibiting extortion schemes involving threats to damage or illicitly 
obtain information from a protected computer). In addition, it is important to note that 
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” are not always used in tandem 
within the statute. Specifically, some CFAA provisions only prohibit access “without au-
thorization.” For example, 18 USC § 1030(a)(3) criminalizes the actions of an individual 
who “intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a depart-
ment or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer.” 
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speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or 
storage functions,” as well as “any data storage facility or commu-
nications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction 
with such device.”16 Though several CFAA provisions are applica-
ble only to “protected computers,”17 that term extends to any com-
puter “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or com-
munication.”18 Courts and commentators view this definition as 
encompassing “all computers with Internet access.”19 
As a result of Congress’s broad conceptualization of “com-
puter,” the applicability of the CFAA’s unauthorized access pro-
visions is not limited to traditional desktop or laptop computers. 
For example, courts have applied these provisions in cases involv-
ing purportedly unauthorized accesses to websites, on the theory 
that the servers hosting such websites constitute computers un-
der the CFAA.20 Thus, the scope of computers subject to the 
CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions is quite expansive.  
In sharp contrast to the generally well-understood meaning 
of computers, courts have split on the meanings of the CFAA’s 
unauthorized access terms—“without authorization” and “ex-
ceeds authorized access.” With respect to “without authorization,” 
this is unsurprising—the statute simply does not define that 
term. However, courts have also struggled to apply “exceeds au-
thorized access,” which the statute does define, albeit somewhat 
ambiguously, as “to access a computer with authorization and to 
use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer 
that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”21 This con-
fusion about the meaning of “without authorization” and “exceeds 
 
 16 18 USC § 1030(e)(1). 
 17 See, for example, 18 USC § 1030(a)(2)(C), (4)–(5), (7). 
 18 18 USC § 1030(e)(2)(B). 
 19 United States v Nosal, 676 F3d 854, 859 (9th Cir 2012) (en banc) (Nosal I). See also 
Samantha Jensen, Comment, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad 
Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 Hamline L Rev 81, 92–93 (2013); Garrett D. Urban, 
Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current Judicial Inter-
pretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 Wm 
& Mary L Rev 1369, 1384 & n 88 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 Minn L Rev 1561, 1568 (2010). In addition, some commen-
tators have argued that even an Internet connection might not be necessary to render a 
computer “protected.” See, for example, Kerr, 94 Minn L Rev at 1571 (arguing that  
“protected computer” covers any machine that has “a microchip or that permits digital 
storage”). 
 20 See hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, 938 F3d 985, 999 (9th Cir 2019) (characterizing 
servers as “protected computer[s]” under the CFAA), petition for cert filed (Mar 9, 2020). 
 21 18 USC § 1030(e)(6). 
1444 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1437 
 
authorized access” is at the core of the CFAA unauthorized access 
circuit split, examined in the next Part. 
II.  CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHAT IS UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS? 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the statute’s lack of defini-
tional clarity, the federal courts of appeals are split regarding the 
meaning of the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions—namely, 
the proper interpretation of “without authorization” and “exceeds 
authorized access.”22 This split features two competing ap-
proaches: the broad approach (articulating a more expansive view 
of the conduct prohibited by these terms) and the narrow ap-
proach (asserting a more limited view of the proscribed conduct). 
At a high level, this split is driven by opposing views regarding 
whether the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions should ac-
count for the purpose of a given access. In other words, courts dis-
agree about whether an access of a computer is unauthorized un-
der the CFAA if the accesser has permission to access the 
computer but does so for a purpose of which the computer owner 
does not approve. 
This Part examines the contours of the CFAA unauthorized 
access circuit split in greater depth. Part II.A begins with a brief 
review of the CFAA’s legislative history, focusing specifically on 
how that source offers little help in elucidating the meaning of the 
unauthorized access provisions. Part II.B then discusses the  
purpose-focused inquiry of the broad approach, while Part II.C 
examines the permission-focused narrow approach. Part II.D con-
cludes by analyzing two additional concepts—permission revoca-
tion and the public/private computer distinction—that have 
emerged in more recent CFAA unauthorized access cases. 
A. (A Largely Unhelpful) Legislative History 
The CFAA’s legislative history offers little interpretive help 
in resolving the unauthorized access circuit split. The statute’s 
drafters appear not to have realized that the terms “without au-
thorization” and “exceeds authorized access” would be perceived 
 
 22 As of May 3, 2020, the Supreme Court has granted one certiorari petition relevant 
to the CFAA unauthorized access circuit split, and another is currently pending before the 
Court. See generally United States v Van Buren, 940 F3d 1192 (11th Cir 2019), cert 
granted, 2020 WL 1906566; hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, 938 F3d 985 (9th Cir 2019), 
petition for cert filed (Mar 9, 2020). In 2017, the Court denied certiorari petitions pertain-
ing to two relevant Ninth Circuit cases concerning the split. See generally Nosal v United 
States, 138 S Ct 314 (2017); Power Ventures, Inc v Facebook, Inc, 138 S Ct 313 (2017). 
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as ambiguous, resulting in a “sparse legislative record.”23 Moreo-
ver, the content that the record does include sheds little light on 
what Congress intended to accomplish with the unauthorized ac-
cess provisions. Courts and commentators generally agree that in 
passing the original 1984 version of the statute, Congress was pri-
marily concerned about the threat of computer hacking, which it 
understood as “trespassing into computer systems or data.”24 The 
original statute, like the present version, prohibited access “with-
out authorization.”25 However, in place of “exceeds authorized ac-
cess,” the statute penalized one who, “having accessed a computer 
with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for 
purposes to which such authorization does not extend.”26 In the 
1986 amendments to the CFAA, Congress replaced that language 
with “exceeds authorized access.”27 This modification is the source 
of much of the present confusion surrounding the scope of the un-
authorized access provisions—a confusion that the AGR Frame-
work, introduced in Part III.B, is intended to remedy. 
There is some dispute about whether the 1984 language ac-
tually supports the broad approach’s purpose-based view of the 
CFAA.28 However, even assuming that it does, analysts disagree 
about Congress’s intent behind the 1986 amendments. Propo-
nents of the broad approach posit that “exceeds authorized ac-
cess” is merely a rephrasing of the purpose-based inquiry of the 
1984 language, while narrow-approach advocates counter that 
“exceeds authorized access” is an express rejection of that  
purpose-based view.29 Unhelpfully, both sides can summon con-
gressional commentary supporting their respective approaches.30 
 
 23 David J. Rosen, Note, Limiting Employee Liability Under the CFAA: A Code-Based 
Approach to “Exceeds Authorized Access”, 27 Berkeley Tech L J 737, 744 (2012) (noting, 
for example, that the 1986 Senate Report described the meaning of “exceeds authorized 
access” as “self-explanatory”). 
 24 United States v Valle, 807 F3d 508, 525 (2d Cir 2015). 
 25 Id. 
 26 HR Rep No 98-894 at 2 (emphasis added) (cited in note 10). See also Laura  
Bernescu, Comment, When Is a Hack Not a Hack: Addressing the CFAA’s Applicability to 
the Internet Service Context, 2013 U Chi Legal F 633, 638. 
 27 Valle, 807 F3d at 525. 
 28 See, for example, id at 526 (noting that “even when Congress referenced the user’s 
‘purposes,’ it spoke in terms of the particular computer files or data to which the user’s 
access rights extended”). 
 29 Id at 525–26. 
 30 For examples summarizing both sides of this debate about the 1986 amendments, 
see id; Rosen, Note, 27 Berkeley Tech L J at 745 (cited in note 23). A review of primary 
sources supports commentators’ confusion. Compare S Rep No 99-432 at 9 (cited in 
note 13) (stating that Congress merely intended for “exceeds authorized access” to 
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Thus, courts have “generally steer[ed] clear of the CFAA’s legis-
lative history” in interpreting the statute’s unauthorized access 
provisions.31 
B. The Broad Approach 
This Part examines the broad-approach side of the CFAA un-
authorized access circuit split. Part II.B.1 offers an overview of 
the purpose-focused nature of the inquiry, with Part II.B.2 diving 
deeper into the question of how broad-approach courts determine 
whether a given purpose is authorized. Part II.B.3 then evaluates 
the benefits and drawbacks of this approach. 
1. A purpose-focused inquiry. 
The First,32 Fifth,33 Seventh,34 and Eleventh35 Circuits have 
adopted a broad interpretation of the CFAA’s unauthorized access 
provisions. According to this view, the CFAA’s unauthorized ac-
cess provisions necessitate a purpose-focused inquiry into ac-
cess—in other words, focusing on whether the accesser accessed 
a given computer for a purpose authorized by the computer 
owner.36 Thus, under the broad approach, the fact that an individ-
ual has been granted general permission to access a computer 
does not necessarily insulate him from CFAA unauthorized ac-
cess liability.37 
A brief example helps to illustrate the broad approach’s im-
plications. CFAA unauthorized access cases often arise in the  
employer-employee context,38 with a typical fact pattern involving 
 
“simplify the language” of the 1984 Act), with id at 21 (additional views of Sens Mathias 
and Leahy) (stating that the amendment would remove from the CFAA’s scope “authorized 
access that aims at purposes to which such authorization does not extend”) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 31 Rosen, Note, 27 Berkeley Tech L J at 744–45 (cited in note 23). For additional 
discussion of the various conflicting purposes underlying the CFAA, see Urban, Note, 52 
Wm & Mary L Rev at 1382–92 (cited in note 19). 
 32 EF Cultural Travel BV v Explorica, Inc, 274 F3d 577, 582–84 & n 10 (1st Cir 2001). 
 33 United States v John, 597 F3d 263, 271–72 (5th Cir 2010). 
 34 International Airport Centers, LLC v Citrin, 440 F3d 418, 420 (7th Cir 2006). 
 35 United States v Rodriguez, 628 F3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir 2010). 
 36 See, for example, John, 597 F3d at 272 (stating that “[a]ccess to a computer and 
data that can be obtained from that access may be exceeded if the purposes for which 
access has been given are exceeded”). 
 37 See, for example, Rodriguez, 628 F3d at 1263 (government employee had general 
permission to access a database, but was still found liable under the CFAA on the theory 
that his permission to access the database did not extend to “nonbusiness reasons”). 
 38 See, for example, id at 1260 (federal government employee); John, 597 F3d at 269 
(financial institution employee); Citrin, 440 F3d at 419 (real estate business employee). 
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some variation of the following chronology: (1) Alpha Company 
grants employee Jim access to its Database, (2) Jim signs an  
employment agreement agreeing to only use the Database for 
business purposes, (3) Jim uses the Database for nonbusiness 
purposes, and (4) Alpha files suit under the CFAA.39 A broad- 
approach court would likely hold that Jim violated the CFAA by 
exceeding authorized access—while Jim had general permission 
to access the Database, his access for nonbusiness purposes ex-
ceeded the scope of this access authorization. In other words, Jim 
had permission to access the Database, but used that permission 
for an unauthorized purpose. 
2. What purposes are authorized? 
As the above example illustrates, the broad approach hinges 
on a purpose-based inquiry, asking whether the accesser accessed 
the computer for a purpose authorized by the computer owner. 
However, broad-approach courts have adopted differing methods 
for determining what purposes are authorized in a given scenario. 
Generally, the broad-approach courts agree that an individ-
ual engages in unauthorized access when he accesses a computer 
for a purpose that the computer owner expressly prohibited. 
United States v Rodriguez40 paradigmatically illustrates this ap-
proach. In Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Social Se-
curity Administration (SSA) employee violated the CFAA by ac-
cessing SSA databases for nonbusiness purposes (in this case, 
gathering personal information about various women in order to 
harass them).41 In reaching this conclusion, the court claimed to 
rely on a plain-language interpretation of the CFAA.42 The SSA, 
the court noted, maintained a policy prohibiting the nonbusiness 
use of its databases and communicated this policy to employees 
through training sessions and notices.43 Rodriguez’s authoriza-
tion to use these databases, then, extended to business uses 
 
 39 A private right of action for monetary damages or injunctive relief is available to 
“[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of [the CFAA]. 18 USC 
§ 1030(g).” This hypothetical roughly approximates the facts of John, 597 F3d at 269;  
Rodriguez, 628 F3d at 1260–62; and Valle, 807 F3d at 512–13. 
 40 628 F3d 1258 (11th Cir 2010). 
 41 Id at 1260–63. 
 42 Id at 1263 (arguing that “the plain language of the [CFAA] forecloses any argu-
ment that Rodriguez did not exceed his authorized access”). 
 43 Id at 1260. 
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only.44 Thus, by accessing the databases for nonbusiness pur-
poses, Rodriguez necessarily exceeded his authorized access.45 
Some broad-approach courts have gone further, holding that 
an individual need not violate an expressly communicated pur-
pose limitation (such as the policy in Rodriguez) in order to en-
gage in CFAA unauthorized access. Rather, under this view, 
courts treat certain access purposes as presumptively unauthor-
ized. The First Circuit offered an early version of this theory in 
EF Cultural Travel BV v Explorica, Inc,46 which involved a tour 
company (Explorica) deploying a custom computer program to 
“scrape” publicly available pricing information from a competi-
tor’s (EF Cultural Travel’s) website and then using that infor-
mation to systematically undercut EF’s tour prices.47 There, the 
court concluded that Explorica’s activities likely exceeded its au-
thorized access to EF’s website.48 Though EF’s website did not 
contain any explicit statement prohibiting website users from ex-
tracting the site’s publicly available data,49 the court nonetheless 
concluded that such a use of the website was beyond the scope of 
what EF would have authorized, reasoning that Explorica’s use 
of the EF website “reek[ed]” of unauthorized access.50 
The Fifth Circuit expanded on this theory in United States v 
John,51 in which the court held that Dimetriace Eva-Lavon John, 
a Citigroup employee, violated the CFAA when she used her ac-
cess to customer-account information to convey that information 
to her half brother, who used it to make fraudulent charges.52 The 
court advanced two lines of argument in justifying this conclu-
sion. First, it adopted a plain-language approach similar to that 
 
 44 Rodriguez, 628 F3d at 1263. 
 45 Id. 
 46 274 F3d 577 (1st Cir 2001). 
 47 Id at 579–80, 583. 
 48 Id at 582–84. This decision arrived in the First Circuit on appeal from a prelimi-
nary injunction that the district court granted against Explorica. Id at 580. Thus, the court 
did not rule on the merits of the CFAA unauthorized access issue, stating only that EF 
was “likely to prove such excessive access.” Id at 582. 
 49 See id at 580 & n 6 (noting that the EF website included a copyright symbol, but 
describing no additional notice prohibiting data scraping). 
 50 EF Cultural Travel, 274 F3d at 583. The court focused on two factors: (1) that Ex-
plorica had used an automated data-scraper tool to extract the relevant data; and (2) that 
that tool was built with proprietary information from a former EF employee. See id. These 
two realities, the court reasoned, distinguished the instant case from a situation in which, 
for instance, Explorica had simply manually extracted information from the website 
through repeated searches. Id. 
 51 597 F3d 263 (5th Cir 2010). 
 52 Id at 269. 
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employed in Rodriguez, holding that an employer can limit an em-
ployee’s authorization to use a computer to specific purposes.53 
Under this standard, John’s actions clearly exceeded her author-
ized access—the court noted that Citigroup maintained policies 
prohibiting the misuse of customer information and communi-
cated those policies to employees through training programs 
(which John attended).54 Second, the court justified its decision on 
a broader reasoning, suggesting that John’s access of the data-
base to perpetrate fraud was presumptively unauthorized. Citing 
an earlier Fifth Circuit decision55 for the proposition that courts 
have analyzed an individual’s access authorization through the 
prism of a computer’s “expected norms of intended use,” the court 
concluded that John’s access was necessarily unauthorized—
surely, perpetrating fraud was not an intended use of the 
Citigroup database.56 Moreover, the court argued, even in the ab-
sence of an express employer policy prohibiting database misuse, 
John presumably “ha[d] reason to know” that she was not author-
ized to access customer information in service of a fraud scheme.57 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit has adopted the most expansive 
view of the broad approach, relying on common-law agency prin-
ciples to hold that an employee’s mere acquisition of “adverse in-
terests” is sufficient to strip him of authorization to access the 
employer’s computers.58 Thus, in International Airport Centers, 
LLC v Citrin,59 the Seventh Circuit held that an employee who 
decided to quit his job and proceeded to delete data on his  
company-provided laptop violated the CFAA.60 In the court’s view, 
the employee’s decision to quit his job and delete the files 
breached his duty of loyalty to his employer, thereby “termi-
nat[ing] his agency relationship . . . and with it his authority to 
access the laptop.”61 Given the breadth of this agency-theory 
 
 53 Id at 272 (stating that “[a]ccess to a computer and data that can be obtained from 
that access may be exceeded if the purposes for which access has been given are exceeded”). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See generally United States v Phillips, 477 F3d 215 (5th Cir 2007). 
 56 John, 597 F3d at 271–72. The court also approvingly cited the First Circuit’s idea 
that certain accesses may simply “reek[ ]” of unauthorized use. Id at 272, citing EF  
Cultural Travel, 274 F3d at 583. 
 57 John, 597 F3d at 273. 
 58 Citrin, 440 F3d at 420–21. 
 59 440 F3d 418 (7th Cir 2006). 
 60 Id at 419–21. 
 61 Id at 420–21. 
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interpretation, it is perhaps unsurprising that courts have largely 
not adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning.62 
3. Benefits and drawbacks of the broad approach. 
The broad approach allows the CFAA to address an expan-
sive range of computer-based misconduct. One could argue that 
this broader read of the CFAA is necessary in the face of modern 
computer crime, which is not limited to the archetypical hacker 
threat that the statute was originally intended to address. In-
deed, modern computer criminals often take the form of “insider 
threats”—for example, employees utilizing their granted access to 
undermine their employers’ interests. Thus, the broad approach 
allows organizations to more effectively enforce proper use of 
their computer systems and thereby protect their proprietary  
information.63 
Courts and commentators have criticized the broad approach, 
however, for essentially allowing private entities to determine 
what constitutes a CFAA violation. The broad approach is notable 
in that it allows employment contracts, confidentiality agree-
ments, terms-of-service (TOS) agreements, and similar docu-
ments to define the boundaries of authorized access.64 For in-
stance, under the broad approach, a website owner could 
theoretically render a given use unauthorized, without any notice 
to users, merely by changing its TOS agreement.65 Thus, commen-
tators have suggested that the broad approach may render the 
CFAA unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, necessitating the 
adoption of the narrow approach.66 
 
 62 See Annie Lee, Note, Algorithmic Auditing and Competition Under the CFAA: The 
Revocation Paradigm of Interpreting Access and Authorization, 33 Berkeley Tech L J 1307, 
1313 & n 36 (2018). 
 63 Though trade secret law may offer some help in this context, it is far from a perfect 
solution. Specifically, the type of information stolen by an insider may fail a trade secret 
statute’s economic-value or secrecy-measure requirements, particularly if it is stored on a 
shared database. For additional discussion of the intersection between trade secret law 
and the CFAA, see note 117. 
 64 See, for example, EF Cultural Travel, 274 F3d at 583–84 (confidentiality agree-
ment); John, 597 F3d at 272–73 (official company policy, reinforced through training  
programs). 
 65 See United States v Nosal, 676 F3d 854, 862 (9th Cir 2012) (en banc) (Nosal I) 
(noting that “website owners retain the right to change the terms [of service] at any time 
and without notice”). 
 66 See Jensen, Comment, 36 Hamline L Rev at 84 (cited in note 19) (arguing that 
“[o]nly a narrow interpretation of the CFAA keeps the statute constitutional”). 
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As Part III will illustrate, the AGR Framework is responsive 
to the broad approach’s goal of allowing computer owners to pro-
tect their systems. The Framework’s third step, focused on per-
mission revocation, provides a mechanism by which computer 
owners can achieve this objective: If a computer owner does not 
like how an accesser is utilizing his granted access, then the 
owner can simply revoke that accesser’s permission and then 
bring a CFAA action in response to any future accesses. At the 
same time, however, the Framework imposes important limita-
tions on CFAA liability—for instance, by clearly limiting CFAA 
unauthorized access liability to private computers (via Step 1) 
and requiring that revocations under Step 3 be affirmatively 
made by the computer owner (rather than simply conveyed in, for 
example, a TOS modification). These limitations, in turn, protect 
the Framework from the overbreadth criticisms frequently levied 
against the broad approach. 
C. The Narrow Approach 
This Section explores the narrow approach to CFAA unau-
thorized access. Part II.C.1 examines the permission-focused in-
quiry at the heart of the narrow approach, while Part II.C.2 dis-
cusses the approach’s benefits and drawbacks. 
1. A permission-focused inquiry. 
The Second,67 Fourth,68 and Ninth69 Circuits have adopted a 
narrow interpretation of the CFAA’s unauthorized access provi-
sions.70 Under this interpretation, unauthorized access occurs 
only when an individual accesses a computer that he does not 
have permission to access. In other words, the accesser’s purpose 
is irrelevant—according to the narrow approach, individuals do 
not violate the CFAA merely by using their granted access  
permission for purposes that contravene organizational policies71 
or violate their duty of loyalty to an employer.72 Therefore, under 
the hypothetical discussed at the beginning of Part II.B.1, a 
 
 67 Valle, 807 F3d at 524–28. 
 68 WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v Miller, 687 F3d 199, 204–06 (4th Cir 2012). 
 69 Nosal I, 676 F3d at 862–63. 
 70 It is worth noting that this interpretation seems relatively ascendant. All of the 
narrow-approach opinions discussed in this Section were issued in 2012 or later, whereas 
all of the broad-approach decisions discussed in Part II.B were issued in 2010 or earlier. 
 71 But see John, 597 F3d at 272; Rodriguez, 628 F3d at 1260. 
 72 But see Citrin, 440 F3d at 420–21. 
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narrow-approach court would find that Jim did not violate the 
CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions. Alpha Company had 
granted Jim permission to access its Database, and that fact is 
sufficient to result in a finding of no unauthorized access under 
the narrow approach. 
Accordingly, the narrow-approach inquiry focuses on permis-
sion, asking whether the accesser had permission to access (or 
“validly accessed”) the computer in question.73 Thus, the narrow 
approach, in contrast to the broad approach, greatly minimizes 
the relevance of the employee’s access purpose, so long as the em-
ployee had general permission to access the computer. For exam-
ple, in United States v Nosal74 (Nosal I), the Ninth Circuit held 
that no CFAA unauthorized access occurred when employees of 
Korn/Ferry (an executive search firm) removed information from 
Korn/Ferry’s confidential databases and passed that information 
to David Nosal, a former employee looking to start a competing 
business, even though such actions clearly violated company pol-
icies.75 Similarly, in United States v Valle,76 the Second Circuit 
held that Gilberto Valle (a New York City Police Department of-
ficer) did not violate the CFAA when he used his access to law 
enforcement databases to view information about a woman he 
had discussed kidnapping as part of his involvement in an online 
sex fetish community, even though such access contravened 
NYPD policies limiting database access to law enforcement  
purposes.77 
In reaching these conclusions, the narrow-approach courts 
relied primarily on the rule of lenity.78 This principle of statutory 
interpretation requires that courts interpret ambiguous criminal 
laws narrowly, so as to “provide fair warning of what constitutes 
criminal conduct, minimize[ ] the risk of selective or arbitrary en-
forcement, and strike[ ] the appropriate balance between the leg-
islature and the court in defining criminal liability.”79 The CFAA’s 
 
 73 Miller, 687 F3d at 204. 
 74 676 F3d 854 (9th Cir 2012) (en banc). 
 75 Id at 856, 864. The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion on similar facts in 
Miller. See Miller, 687 F3d at 202, 206. 
 76 807 F3d 508 (2d Cir 2015). 
 77 Id at 512–13, 523–28. Notably, the court held that Valle’s discussions of kidnap-
ping the woman in question represented mere fantasizing, and thus did not rise to the 
level of conspiracy to kidnap. See id at 511. Thus, this case is distinguishable from John, 
in which the alleged unauthorized access was in service of a broader criminal scheme. See 
John, 597 F3d at 269–70 (applying the broad approach). 
 78 See Nosal I, 676 F3d at 863; Miller, 687 F3d at 205–06; Valle, 807 F3d at 523. 
 79 Valle, 807 F3d at 523. 
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text and legislative history, these courts reason, can plausibly be 
read as ambiguous (though individual courts differ somewhat re-
garding the precise degree of that ambiguity).80 Given an ambig-
uous statute, then, the rule of lenity demands an interpretation 
that restricts said statute’s scope of liability.81 
The permission-centric nature of the narrow approach has 
the corresponding effect of diminishing the importance, for CFAA 
unauthorized access purposes, of use-restriction policies—for ex-
ample, employment agreements, information-technology use pol-
icies, TOS agreements, and other documents describing how an 
individual may use a computer. Indeed, narrow-approach courts 
have essentially rejected the notion (suggested by broad-approach 
cases like John and Rodriguez) that an individual can engage in 
unauthorized access merely by violating a use-restriction policy.82 
2. Benefits and drawbacks of the narrow approach. 
From the perspective of a computer owner looking to protect 
his computer from malevolent actors, the narrow approach is un-
doubtedly problematic. After all, by removing purpose from the 
unauthorized access inquiry, the narrow approach curtails the 
CFAA’s applicability to individuals who use their granted access 
permissions to engage in conduct contrary to the computer 
owner’s interests. Indeed, in narrow-approach cases, the accesser 
often acts in knowing violation of express employer prohibitions.83 
Under the broad approach, such actions would almost certainly 
result in CFAA liability. However, under the narrow approach, 
the malicious purpose of the access simply does not matter—in 
 
 80 Nosal I and Miller reason that the CFAA’s text and legislative history support a 
narrower reading of the Act, even without the rule of lenity. Nosal I, 676 F3d at 863 (fram-
ing the narrow approach as a “more sensible reading of the text and legislative history of 
a statute whose general purpose is to punish hacking”); Miller, 687 F3d at 207 (expressing 
an unwillingness “to contravene Congress’s intent by transforming a statute meant to tar-
get hackers into a vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access computers or infor-
mation in bad faith”). In contrast, Valle offers a more ambivalent view of the text and 
legislative history’s clarity. Valle, 807 F3d at 524 (asserting that the CFAA’s text is “read-
ily susceptible to different interpretations”); id at 526 (finding “support in the legislative 
history for both” the broad and narrow approaches). 
 81 See, for example, Valle, 807 F3d at 523 (concluding that “the rule of lenity requires 
us to adopt the defendant’s [narrow] construction”). 
 82 See, for example, United States v Nosal, 844 F3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir 2016) 
(Nosal II) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has “held that authorization is not pegged to web-
site terms and conditions”). 
 83 See, for example, Nosal I, 676 F3d at 856 & n 1; Miller, 687 F3d at 202; Valle, 807 
F3d at 513. 
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the view of these courts, the fact that an individual has permis-
sion to access a computer is sufficient to shield them from CFAA 
unauthorized access liability. 
Courts adopting a narrow view of CFAA unauthorized access 
have justified their approach as helping to limit the scope of the 
CFAA to that of an “anti-hacking statute,” rather than “an expan-
sive misappropriation statute.”84 As suggested above, narrow- 
approach courts view this limitation of the CFAA’s scope as ne-
cessitated by a combination of the rule of lenity and the statute’s 
text and legislative history. As an initial matter, narrow-ap-
proach courts are generally sympathetic to a reading of the 
CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions as being specifically fo-
cused on the hacker threat.85 However, these courts also argue 
that, even if it is conceded that the CFAA’s text and legislative 
history is ambiguous, the rule of lenity dictates a narrower inter-
pretation to avoid turning vast swaths of relatively innocent be-
havior (like checking personal emails on a work computer) into 
federal crimes “simply because a computer is involved.”86 
This goal of limiting the CFAA’s scope is one served by the 
AGR Framework presented in Part III.B. Steps 2 and 3 of the 
Framework focus expressly on the granting and revocation of per-
mission, heavily drawing upon the logic of the narrow-approach 
cases. Moreover, the Framework, leveraging the concept of the 
public/private computer distinction, extends the logic of the nar-
row approach to conclude that CFAA unauthorized access cannot 
occur in the context of a computer that is publicly available. 
D. Additional Concepts 
Not all CFAA unauthorized access cases can be neatly cate-
gorized into the broad- or narrow-approach frameworks. The 
cases detailed in the previous two sections predominantly took 
place in the employer-employee context and hinged on analyses 
of access purpose (for the broad approach) or access permission 
(for the narrow approach). However, in recent years, circuit courts 
have decided CFAA unauthorized access cases that took place 
outside of the employment context and involved analytical con-
siderations other than those of access purpose and access 
 
 84 Nosal I, 676 F3d at 857. 
 85 See, for example, id at 858–59 (characterizing the CFAA’s scope as focused  
primarily on computer hacking). 
 86 Id at 860. 
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permission. In adjudicating these cases, courts have articulated 
two concepts—revocation and the public/private computer dis-
tinction—that earlier discussions of the CFAA unauthorized ac-
cess circuit split largely ignored. The AGR Framework explained 
in Part III.B incorporates these concepts into its analytical ap-
proach, thus filling a key gap in existing CFAA unauthorized ac-
cess jurisprudence. 
The sections below explore both of these concepts in greater 
depth. Part II.D.1 discusses the concept of authorization revoca-
tion, in particular focusing on initial steps that the Ninth Circuit 
has taken to define how such revocation can be effectuated. 
Part II.D.2 examines the distinction between public and private 
computers, and explores how the CFAA’s unauthorized access 
provisions may apply differently to each type of computer. 
1. Revocation. 
The cases discussed in Parts II.B and II.C offer extensive dis-
cussion of what makes a given access authorized, but largely ig-
nore the question of whether and how such authorization can be 
terminated. However, the Ninth Circuit has recently outlined a 
theory of CFAA authorization revocation, which Step 3 of the 
AGR Framework largely adopts. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 
has stated that (1) an individual’s authorization to access a com-
puter can be revoked and (2) postrevocation attempts to access 
that computer, whether through a third party or “technological 
gamesmanship,” can constitute CFAA unauthorized access.87 
United States v Nosal88 (Nosal II) offers an application of the 
Ninth Circuit’s revocation theory. This case involved the same 
parties as Nosal I.89 By the time of Nosal II, Nosal and two of his 
accomplices (Becky Christian and Mark Jacobson) had left 
Korn/Ferry, and Korn/Ferry had revoked their computer access 
credentials.90 However, Christian and Jacobson subsequently bor-
rowed credentials from Nosal’s former executive assistant and 
used those credentials to extract information from Korn/Ferry’s 
computer systems.91 The court held that this conduct constituted 
access “‘without authorization’ in violation of the CFAA.”92 
 
 87 Facebook, Inc v Power Ventures, Inc, 844 F3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir 2016). 
 88 844 F3d 1024 (9th Cir 2016). 
 89 See text accompanying notes 74–75. 
 90 Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1029, 1031. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id at 1038. 
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Specifically, applying its revocation model, the court held that 
(1) Korn/Ferry’s revocation of Nosal, Christian, and Jacobson’s 
access credentials “unequivocally conveyed” that they had “no au-
thorization to access Korn/Ferry’s computer system,”93 and 
(2) their subsequent use of the executive assistant’s login creden-
tials to access Korn/Ferry’s databases therefore amounted to 
CFAA unauthorized access.94 
Facebook, Inc v Power Ventures, Inc,95 decided one week after 
Nosal II, expanded on the Ninth Circuit’s revocation model by 
identifying additional mechanisms (namely, cease-and-desist let-
ters and technical countermeasures) through which authorization 
can be revoked. In Power Ventures, the court considered a case 
involving Facebook and Power.com, a rival social media site 
whose business model essentially consisted of allowing users to 
aggregate their various social media profiles on a single plat-
form.96 Power launched a promotional campaign that allowed its 
users to promote Power by clicking a button on its website that, 
in turn, automatically created a post on the user’s Facebook pro-
file.97 Facebook responded by sending Power a “cease and desist 
letter” and implementing an Internet Protocol (IP) block “to pre-
vent Power from accessing the Facebook website.”98 Power ig-
nored the cease-and-desist letter and technically circumvented 
the IP block, thereby allowing it to continue its campaign.99 The 
court held that Facebook’s cease-and-desist letter constituted a 
revocation of authorization,100 and noted that the IP block “further 
demonstrated that Facebook had rescinded permission for Power 
 
 93 Id at 1036. 
 94 Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1038. The court also rejected the relevance of the executive 
assistant having voluntarily provided her access credentials to Christian and Jacobson, 
stating that she “had no mantle or authority to override Korn/Ferry’s authority to control 
access to its computers.” Id at 1035. 
 95 844 F3d 1058 (9th Cir 2016). 
 96 Id at 1062. 
 97 Id at 1063. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1063. 
 100 Id at 1069. 
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to access Facebook’s computers.”101 Thus, the court concluded, 
Power violated the CFAA by engaging in subsequent access.102 
2. The public/private computer distinction. 
The canonical broad- and narrow-approach cases primarily 
occurred in the employment context, and thus involved what 
could be characterized as private computers—those not available 
to the general public.103 Common sense would suggest that the 
concept of unauthorized access would apply differently to comput-
ers that are publicly accessible. Indeed, some courts have adopted 
this view, holding that public computers cannot be subject to un-
authorized access, a premise that Step 1 of the AGR Framework 
adopts as well. 
For example, in Pulte Homes, Inc v Laborers’ International 
Union of North America,104 the Sixth Circuit held that a labor un-
ion did not engage in access “without authorization” when it 
“bombarded” a construction company’s public-facing email sys-
tem with thousands of emails.105 In so concluding, the court relied 
primarily on the publicly accessible nature of the computers in 
question—in other words, because the company’s email systems 
were open to the public (accessible without the need to use, for 
example, a password), the union had authorization to access 
them, even if such access was contrary to the construction com-
pany’s interests.106 
 
 101 Id at 1068. In a footnote, the court cautioned that “[s]imply bypassing an IP ad-
dress, without more, would not constitute unauthorized use,” noting the possibility that a 
blocked user might not realize that he has been blocked, or that he may discover the block 
and “conclude that it was triggered by misconduct by someone else who shares the same 
IP address, such as [his] roommate or co-worker.” Id at 1068 n 5. Thus, the court seemed 
to imply that an IP block must be accompanied by some more explicit form of notice (like 
a cease-and-desist letter) in order to constitute a valid revocation of authorization. 
 102 Id at 1068. 
 103 It is true that EF Cultural Travel involved scraping data from a publicly available 
website. However, that case also involved an allegation that the relevant data-scraping 
tool was based, in part, on confidential information that a former EF employee had pro-
vided to Explorica. See EF Cultural Travel, 274 F3d at 583. This fact thus distinguishes 
EF Cultural Travel from the two cases discussed in this Section, neither of which involve 
any claimed misuse of confidential information. 
 104 648 F3d 295 (6th Cir 2011). 
 105 Id at 299, 304. The construction company raised its unauthorized access claim un-
der 18 USC § 1030(a)(5)(B) and (C), both of which criminalize only access “without author-
ization.” Id at 300. Thus, the court left open the question of whether the union “exceed[ed] 
authorized access” under the CFAA. See id at 304. 
 106 Id at 304. 
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The Ninth Circuit applied a similar distinction between pub-
lic and private computers in hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp,107 a 
recent case involving a dispute between LinkedIn and hiQ, a com-
pany that generates data-analytics products based on infor-
mation it scrapes from LinkedIn users’ public profiles.108 This case 
reached the Ninth Circuit on appeal from a preliminary injunc-
tion (hiQ sought to enjoin LinkedIn from denying it access to the 
aforementioned profiles), and so the court did not resolve on the 
merits the issue of whether hiQ’s activities constituted CFAA  
unauthorized access.109 However, in affirming hiQ’s sought-after 
injunction, the court strongly suggested that hiQ’s scraping of 
public LinkedIn data, even after receipt of LinkedIn’s cease-and-
desist letter, would not constitute access “without authoriza-
tion.”110 The key factor driving this conclusion, the court reasoned, 
was the publicly accessible nature of the scraped data. The data 
available on public LinkedIn profiles, the court pointed out, “is 
not owned by LinkedIn and has not been demarcated by LinkedIn 
as private using” a system “such as username and password re-
quirements.”111 Rather, it is “available to anyone with a web 
browser.”112 These factors, the court concluded, thus strongly sug-
gest that hiQ’s scraping activities do not run afoul of the CFAA’s 
unauthorized access provisions.113 
Thus, the current state of the CFAA unauthorized access cir-
cuit split is essentially as follows: The broad and narrow ap-
proaches articulate competing visions of the CFAA unauthorized 
access inquiry. On the one hand, broad-approach courts employ a 
purpose-focused inquiry, asking whether an access was made for 
a purpose authorized by the computer owner, thereby giving com-
puter owners more effective control over the use of their systems. 
On the other hand, narrow-approach courts, seeking to limit the 
CFAA’s punitive scope, advance a permission-focused inquiry, 
discarding access purpose and focusing solely on whether the 
 
 107 938 F3d 985 (9th Cir 2019), petition for cert filed (Mar 9, 2020). 
 108 Id at 991. 
 109 Id at 989. 
 110 Id at 1003–04. 
 111 hiQ Labs, 938 F3d at 1003–04. 
 112 Id at 1002. 
 113 Id at 1003–04. The nature of the data involved also distinguishes hiQ Labs from 
Power Ventures, which involved Power’s access to nonpublic Facebook data. Compare hiQ 
Labs, 938 F3d at 1002, with Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1063 (“Facebook has tried to limit 
and control access to its website . . . [and] requires third-party developers or websites that 
wish to contact its users through its site to enroll in a program called Facebook Connect.”). 
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accesser had general permission to access the information in 
question. However, several recent cases have discussed con-
cepts—namely, authorization revocation and the public/private 
computer distinction—that have gone relatively unexamined 
within the canonical circuit-split cases. 
The result of all this is a muddled assortment of competing 
frameworks, concepts, and interests. Given this reality, how can 
courts evaluate CFAA unauthorized access in a manner that is 
both consistent with the Act’s text and purpose, but also applica-
ble to the increasingly diverse contexts in which parties invoke 
the Act’s unauthorized access provisions? Part III provides an  
answer. 
III.  SOLUTION: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING CFAA 
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS 
This Part describes, applies, and assesses this Comment’s 
Available-Granted-Revoked Framework. To begin, Part III.A es-
tablishes the need for a solution to the unauthorized access circuit 
split. Then, Part III.B describes each of the Framework’s three 
analytical steps—whether the computer is publicly available or 
private, whether the computer owner has granted access permis-
sion to the accesser, and whether the computer owner has revoked 
that permission. Next, Part III.C applies the Framework against 
several example fact patterns, demonstrating the analytical clar-
ity that courts applying the Framework will bring to bear on a 
range of challenging scenarios. Finally, Part III.D evaluates the 
drawbacks and benefits of the Framework, ultimately concluding 
that the latter far outweigh the former. 
A. The Need for a Solution 
Before describing the Framework’s specific components, it is 
important to establish why a solution to the unauthorized access 
circuit split is even necessary in the first place. This Section pro-
vides answers to this question. To that end, Part III.A.1 summa-
rizes the current state of CFAA case law, characterized by a per-
sistent circuit split and a growing application of the unauthorized 
access provisions to new factual contexts. Part III.A.2 then out-
lines the unique role that the CFAA’s unauthorized access provi-
sions play in punishing a specific type of computer-related mis-
deed, and why alternative legal frameworks (such as trade secret 
law and contract causes of action) cannot fill that role. 
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1. The continued circuit split and growing application of 
the unauthorized access provisions in nonemployment 
contexts. 
A survey of existing case law and commentary addressing 
CFAA unauthorized access yields two observations. First, the 
meanings of the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds au-
thorized access” remain subject to an active circuit split,114 though 
the narrow approach appears to be gaining traction in more re-
cent cases.115 Second, much of the relevant case law operates 
within the employment context, typically dealing with situations 
in which an employee uses granted computer access for purposes 
contrary to those of his employer. Undoubtedly, unauthorized ac-
cess issues are prevalent in this arena. However, as Part II.D 
noted, the unauthorized access issue is becoming increasingly 
prominent in nonemployment contexts. These cases, in turn,  
apply novel concepts, like revocation and the public/private  
computer distinction, that the employment cases have largely  
ignored.116 
These observations suggest the potential utility of a new ap-
proach to addressing CFAA unauthorized access issues—one that 
reconciles the two sides of the existing circuit split and resolves 
disputes in both the employment and nonemployment contexts. 
The AGR Framework offers precisely such an approach. 
2. Continued relevance of the CFAA unauthorized access 
provisions. 
Of course, it is worth considering whether a solution to the 
unauthorized access circuit split is even necessary. After all,  
the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions are not the sole  
mechanism through which individuals can be punished for 
 
 114 As stated in note 22, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Nosal II and Power 
Ventures. See Nosal v United States, 138 S Ct 314 (2017); Power Ventures, Inc v Facebook, 
Inc, 138 S Ct 313 (2017). However, it recently granted certiorari in United States v Van 
Buren, 940 F3d 1192 (11th Cir 2019), cert granted, 2020 WL 1906566, in which the de-
fendant essentially sought to overrule the Eleventh Circuit’s prior decision in Rodriguez. 
See Van Buren, 940 F3d at 1207. In addition, as of May 3, 2020, a certiorari petition re-
mains pending with regards to hiQ Labs. 
 115 As discussed in note 70, all of the narrow-approach decisions were issued in 2012 
or later, whereas all of the broad-approach decisions were issued in 2010 or earlier. 
 116 See, for example, Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1066–68; Pulte Homes, 648 F3d at 
303; United States v Drew, 259 FRD 449, 461–62 (CD Cal 2009) (concluding “that an in-
tentional breach of [the terms of service] can potentially constitute accessing the MySpace 
computer/server without authorization and/or in excess of authorization”). 
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computer-related misdeeds. For example, CFAA unauthorized ac-
cess cases often involve claims associated with trade secret mis-
appropriation,117 employment-related causes of action (such as 
breach of contract claims),118 and CFAA provisions not involving 
unauthorized access.119 In light of this reality, why not simply al-
low unauthorized access cases to be governed by the legal frame-
works of these alternative causes of action? 
Such an approach is tempting, but ultimately unsatisfying. 
Though the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions overlap with 
other legal frameworks, they are unique in their focus on allowing 
computer owners to protect the integrity of their systems. Unlike 
trade secret laws (activated only when the information in ques-
tion is a trade secret) or contract causes of action (requiring a con-
tractual relationship), the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions 
alone police the specific act of an unauthorized access to a com-
puter. For this reason, the unauthorized access provisions are 
worth saving. 
 
 117 See, for example, Nosal I, 676 F3d at 856 (noting that “[t]he government indicted 
Nosal on twenty counts, including trade secret theft, mail fraud, conspiracy and violations 
of the CFAA”) (emphasis added). Trade secret misappropriation may occur as a result of a 
CFAA unauthorized access—for example, if an employee engages in an unauthorized ac-
cess and then steals a trade secret. However, in order for such a theft to constitute trade 
secret misappropriation, the information stolen must actually be a trade secret, a legal 
term of art governed by specific requirements. For instance, the Economic Espionage Act 
of 1996 states that, in order for information to be a trade secret, it must “derive[ ] inde-
pendent economic value . . . from not being generally known,” and be protected by “reason-
able measures to keep [the] information secret.” 18 USC § 1839. Thus, the fact that an 
individual steals company information through a CFAA unauthorized access does not nec-
essarily mean that the individual engaged in trade secret misappropriation.  
  The shortcomings of trade secret law are further highlighted by the fact that many 
CFAA unauthorized access cases involve information stored on shared databases. See, for 
example, Nosal I, 676 F3d at 856. This reality can make it difficult for employers to estab-
lish that they took reasonable measures to preserve the secrecy of the information in ques-
tion. See Danielle J. Reid, Note, Combating the Enemy Within: Regulating Employee Mis-
appropriation of Business Information, 71 Vand L Rev 1033, 1047 (2018). For additional 
information about the legal frameworks surrounding trade secrets and the protection of 
business information, see id at 1041–49. 
 118 See, for example, American Furukawa, Inc v Hossain, 103 F Supp 3d 864, 866 (ED 
Mich 2015); Estes Forwarding Worldwide LLC v Cuellar, 239 F Supp 3d 918, 920–21 (ED 
Va 2017). See also Urban, Note, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1396–97 (cited in note 19). 
 119 See, for example, 18 USC § 1030(a)(5)(A) (prescribing a punishment for individu-
als who, inter alia, knowingly transmit code that causes damage to a protected computer); 
18 USC § 1030(a)(6) (prescribing a punishment for individuals who traffic passwords); 18 
USC § 1030(a)(7)(A) (prescribing a punishment for individuals who transmit extortionary 
communications threatening to damage a protected computer). The defendant in John was 
convicted of charges under 18 USC § 1029, in addition to his CFAA charges. See John, 597 
F3d at 283. 
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B. Defining the Framework 
The AGR Framework proposes that unauthorized access un-
der the CFAA be evaluated using a three-step, sequential frame-
work, summarized in the diagram below and explained in greater 
detail beginning with Part III.B.1. Note that this Section’s discus-
sion of each of these steps assumes a factual scenario in which X 
accesses Y’s computer (including Y’s computer’s data). 
 
FIGURE 1: THE AVAILABLE-GRANTED-REVOKED FRAMEWORK 
 
Assume that X accesses Y’s computer. . . 
 
1. Public versus private computers. 
This step considers whether Y’s computer is publicly availa-
ble. If Y’s computer is publicly available, then the analysis con-
cludes with a finding that X has not engaged in CFAA unauthor-
ized access. If Y’s computer is not publicly available (in other 
STEP 1: Public vs. Private 
Computer 
Is Y’s computer publicly  
available?  
Yes CONCLUDE ANALYSIS 
No CFAA unauthorized access 
No 
STEP 2: Permission to Access 
Has Y at any point granted per-
mission to X to access Y’s com-
puter? 
STEP 3: Affirmative  
Revocation 
Has Y affirmatively revoked X’s 
permission to access said com-
puter (for example, through a 




No CONCLUDE ANALYSIS 
No CFAA unauthorized access 
Yes 
CONCLUDE ANALYSIS 
CFAA unauthorized access 
CONCLUDE ANALYSIS 
CFAA unauthorized access 
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words, if Y’s computer is a private computer), then the analysis 
proceeds to Step 2. 
Under this standard, a computer that is publicly available 
cannot be subject to CFAA unauthorized access.120 Thus, this step 
reflects the principle, advanced in Pulte Homes and hiQ Labs but 
largely ignored in the employment-centric CFAA cases (where the 
relevant computers are private), that public computers simply lie 
outside the scope of the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions.121 
Beyond aligning with the holdings of Pulte Homes and hiQ Labs, 
this principle is likely consistent with most people’s normative in-
tuitions. Simply put, it makes sense that computers made freely 
available to the public cannot be accessed in an unauthorized 
manner. Authorization, after all, implies a degree of control over 
who accesses a computer, and if the entities controlling public 
computers wanted to limit access, they would not have made 
them public. 
Courts should face minimal difficulties in differentiating be-
tween public and private computers. Specifically, courts could as-
sess whether the computer is protected by access permissions 
(such as username and password requirements).122 Given that 
this step is intended largely as a threshold question to determine 
whether the CFAA unauthorized access provisions apply, such a 
limited inquiry is likely sufficient. 
2. Permission to access. 
This step considers whether Y has at any point granted X per-
mission to access the computer. If so, then the analysis proceeds 
to Step 3. If Y has never granted X permission to access the com-
puter, then the analysis concludes with a finding of CFAA unau-
thorized access. 
This step is intended to criminalize the actions of the classic 
hacker, prohibiting an individual from accessing a private com-
puter that he has never had permission to access. Given the 
 
 120 As discussed in Part I.B, the CFAA defines “computer” broadly, and courts have 
treated websites and databases as computers for the purpose of assessing unauthorized 
access. 
 121 See Pulte Homes, 648 F3d at 304; hiQ Labs, 938 F3d at 1003. 
 122 See, for example, hiQ Labs, 938 F3d at 1003 (asserting that the CFAA “without 
authorization” provision is violated “when a person circumvents a computer’s generally 
applicable rules regarding access permissions, such as username and password require-
ments, to gain access to a computer”). 
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CFAA’s historical roots as an anti-hacking statute, it is important 
that the Framework proscribe such behavior. 
Granted, one could certainly imagine definitional issues aris-
ing as courts apply this step. For example, litigants may contest 
the definition of permission. However, this concern can likely be 
addressed by referring back to Step 1, which requires that a com-
puter be protected by an access permission system (such as a 
password) in order to qualify as a private computer protected by 
the CFAA. Thus, Step 2 can, in turn, define “permission” as the 
owner-granted ability to access a private computer. Similarly, lit-
igants may challenge the scope of permissions granted. For exam-
ple, if Y grants X permission to access a database with five com-
ponents, a litigant may question which components X had 
permission to access. The short answer, in keeping with Step 2’s 
focus on addressing the hacker threat, is any component that X 
was technically able to access, using his granted permissions.123 
It is important to note that the Framework’s conception of 
permission in Step 2 is one in which permission is bounded by 
what the accesser is technically able to access. To return to Jim’s 
case as an example, his permission to access a computer is defined 
by what information he is technically able to access, not by what 
Alpha Company says he can access. Thus, if Alpha tells Jim that 
he can only access Database A, but the password that Alpha as-
signed Jim to use in accessing Database A also allows him to ac-
cess Database B, then a court applying the AGR Framework 
would find no unauthorized access for Jim’s access of Database B. 
As this example illustrates, the scope of permission granted un-
der Step 2 is primarily a question of what the accesser is techni-
cally able to access. 
Granted, the AGR Framework’s conception of permission is 
one that places a greater burden on the computer owner than does 
the broad approach. However, this burden is a justified one. First, 
 
 123 It is worth briefly discussing the possibility of unintentionally granted permission. 
One could imagine a scenario in which, for example, Y grants a group of individuals access 
to a database, but accidentally includes X in that group. The Framework would treat this 
as granted permission under Step 2. Broadly speaking, the Framework is intended as a 
relatively objective approach to the issue of CFAA unauthorized access, rather than one 
focused on the subjective perceptions of computer owners and accessers. For example, con-
sider how Step 3’s revocation analysis, discussed below, eschews the amorphous agency 
analysis of Citrin for more objective indicia of permission termination, such as cease-and-
desist letters, password revocations, and technical countermeasures. See Citrin, 440 F3d 
at 420–21. Thus, treating an accidental grant of permission as a valid grant of permission 
aligns with the broader aims of the Framework. 
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the Framework’s safeguard-focused conception of permission is 
one that helps to facilitate notice to accessers. By requiring that 
permission be bounded by technical safeguards, the Framework 
avoids situations in which an individual is faced with CFAA lia-
bility for inadvertently accessing a computer that he does not 
have express consent to access (for instance, if Jim accidentally 
accessed Database B using the password that Alpha provided 
him). Second, if computer owners want to deem certain computers 
off-limits without implementing technical safeguards, they re-
main free to do so under the AGR Framework, albeit outside of 
the CFAA’s protection. For instance, an employer could incorpo-
rate such limitations into its employment agreements. The AGR 
Framework simply forecloses the possibility of such an agreement 
then being used as the basis for criminal liability under the 
CFAA. 
3. Affirmative revocation. 
The Framework’s final step considers whether Y has affirm-
atively revoked X’s permission to access the computer. If Y has 
made an affirmative revocation, then the analysis concludes with 
a finding of unauthorized access. If Y has not made an affirmative 
revocation, then the analysis concludes with a finding of no unau-
thorized access. 
This step, incorporating concepts articulated in Nosal II and 
Power Ventures, is aimed at the actions of individuals who had 
permission to access a computer, but had that access revoked by 
the computer owner. Specifically, Step 3 provides the means for a 
computer owner to “close[ ] both the front door and the back door” 
to individuals that it no longer wants to have access to its com-
puters, with former employees and cease-and-desist recipients be-
ing prime examples.124 Step 3 accomplishes this objective in a 
manner that advances the goals of both the broad and narrow ap-
proaches. Consistent with the broad approach, Step 3 allows com-
puter owners to control who has access to their computers. How-
ever, Step 3 also limits this power in two important ways. 
First, Step 3 mandates the provision of notice to the unau-
thorized accesser. In order to establish an affirmative revocation, 
the computer owner will have to clearly indicate to the accesser—
through measures either explicitly communicative (like a cease-
and-desist letter), technical (like an IP block), or a combination of 
 
 124 Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1028. 
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both (like a password revocation)—that his access is no longer au-
thorized.125 Under such a framework, the scope of impermissible 
behavior becomes much clearer, for both the accessers and courts. 
For instance, rather than engaging in a nebulous analysis of when 
an employee acquires interests adverse to those of his employer 
(as seen in cases like Citrin), courts will simply look to whether a 
purportedly unauthorized access occurred after an affirmative 
revocation took place. 
Second, Step 3 avoids the “parade of horribles” often de-
scribed by critics of the broad approach by removing access pur-
pose from the CFAA unauthorized access inquiry.126 Thus, the em-
ployee who violates his company’s computer-use policy by playing 
online sudoku and the online dater who breaches Tinder’s TOS 
agreement by lying about his height would not face CFAA unau-
thorized access liability merely because their access was for an 
impermissible purpose.127 In these cases, the computer owners 
would be free to revoke the users’ access authorizations; however, 
they could not dictate specific uses, at least in a manner enforce-
able by the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions. 
A key point of contention in implementing this step will be 
defining the parameters of “affirmative revocation.” The case law 
suggests a few methods that would likely qualify, including cease-
and-desist letters128 and the revocation of login credentials.129 
While a full-scale cataloguing of permissible methods of affirma-
tive revocation lies outside the scope of this Comment, it stands 
to reason that the incremental development of such parameters 
lies well within the institutional competencies of the judiciary. 
 
 125 As Power Ventures suggests, a computer owner will ideally convey its revocation 
of authorization through multiple avenues. See Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1068 (noting 
that Facebook’s imposition of an IP block on Power “further demonstrated” the revocation 
of authorization conveyed by a cease-and-desist letter). 
 126 See Nosal I, 676 F3d at 860–62 (listing potential far-reaching negative conse-
quences of the broad approach); id at 866 (Silverman dissenting) (describing the majority’s 
list as a “parade of horribles”). 
 127 See id at 860–62 (majority) (describing how those hypotheticals would be treated 
under the broad approach). This is not to say, of course, that the Framework would render 
such company policies powerless. For example, the employee could still face workplace 
sanctions, and the Tinder user could have his account suspended. The Framework merely 
precludes the possibility of bringing CFAA charges against these individuals. 
 128 See, for example, Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1067–68. 
 129 See, for example, Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1036. In addition, Power Ventures lends 
some support to the idea that the imposition of technical countermeasures (such as IP 
blocks) may indicate a revocation of permission, but suggests that such measures must be 
accompanied by something “more” to communicate to the blocked party that it, specifically, 
has been blocked. See Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1068 & n 5. 
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C. Applying the Framework 
This Section applies the AGR Framework to several of the 
cases discussed in Part II, with the goals of demonstrating how 
courts would practically apply the Framework, comparing the 
Framework’s results with those of the deciding courts, and dis-
cussing adjudicative challenges that courts implementing the 
Framework would encounter. After a brief examination of the 
classic hacking scenario in Part III.C.1, this Section proceeds to 
evaluate the narrow-approach, revocation, and public-computer 
cases in Part III.C.2, followed by the broad-approach cases in 
Part III.C.3. 
As this Section illustrates, application of the Framework gen-
erally yields results consistent with those in the narrow- 
approach, revocation, and public-computer cases. However, the 
Framework’s results diverge from those in several of the broad-
approach cases. 
1. Classic hacking. 
A court applying the Framework to a classic hacking case 
would deem this scenario a CFAA unauthorized access. The com-
puter in such a scenario would presumably be private (Step 1), 
and the hacker presumably never had permission to access the 
computer (Step 2). Given the outcome of Step 2, analysis of Step 3 
would be unnecessary. 
2. Narrow-approach, revocation, and public-computer 
cases. 
a) Nosal I.  A court applying the Framework would find no 
CFAA unauthorized access, consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s 
conclusion. First, the confidential, password-protected Korn/ 
Ferry database would constitute a private computer. Second, 
Nosal’s accomplices had permission to access the database, as 
they were still Korn/Ferry employees at the time of the conduct 
in question. Third, Korn/Ferry had not, at that point in time, re-
voked the accomplices’ access. Thus, a court would find no CFAA 
unauthorized access.130 
b) Power Ventures.  A court applying the Framework would 
find CFAA unauthorized access, consistent with the Ninth 
 
 130 See Nosal I, 676 F3d at 866. A court applying the Framework against the facts of 
Valle would reach a similar result. See Part II.C.1. 
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Circuit’s conclusion. As a threshold matter, the servers hosting 
Facebook users’ password-protected profiles would constitute pri-
vate computers. 
Step 2’s permission analysis is more complex in Power  
Ventures than in previous examples, as this case involved split 
permissions, with two entities (Facebook itself and individual  
Facebook users) conceivably having the ability to give Power per-
mission to access the private computers in question.131 It seems 
reasonable to conclude that Power had permission from  
Facebook’s users to access their private profiles (a sentiment 
shared by the Ninth Circuit),132 but no such permission from  
Facebook itself. This, in turn, raises the question of whether an 
entity (in this case, a Facebook user) that has permission to access 
a computer (in this case, Facebook’s servers) can then provide per-
mission to another entity (in this case, Power) to access that same 
computer.133 
Ultimately, it seems sensible to conclude that accessers who 
have permission to access a computer from the computer’s owner 
should not be able to transfer their permission to individuals to 
whom the computer owner has not given permission. This conclu-
sion is consistent with the Framework’s objective of allowing com-
puter owners to control (to an extent) who is able to access their 
computers. Allowing an authorized accesser (like the Facebook 
users in Power Ventures or the executive assistant in Nosal II) to 
grant access permission for a computer that they do not own 
would seem fundamentally at odds with this objective—effec-
tively diffusing the computer owner’s permission-granting power 
to anyone to whom the owner has already granted permission.134 
An analogy to a noncomputer context is illustrative. If I give you 
a key to my house (in other words, permission to enter), surely I 
have not automatically given you the authority to then extend 
 
 131 See Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1068 (describing split permissions). 
 132 See id at 1067 (arguing that by clicking a button that allowed Power to dissemi-
nate messages through their Facebook profiles, the users “took action akin to allowing a 
friend to use a computer or to log on to an e-mail account”). From this premise, the court 
concluded that, because of the presumed permission from Facebook users, Power “reason-
ably could have thought” that it had permission to access Facebook’s computers. Id. 
 133 A similar fact pattern arose in Nosal II, in which Nosal argued that his former 
executive assistant, by relaying her login credentials to his accomplices, had provided him 
with authorization to access the Korn/Ferry databases. See Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1035–36. 
 134 Here, it is worth recalling that the CFAA defines “computer” as a physical device. 
See 18 USC § 1030(e)(1). Thus, in a case like Power Ventures, the computer in question is 
the server on which Facebook profiles are hosted, not the profile itself. Thus, Facebook, 
not the Facebook user, is best characterized as the computer owner. 
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that permission to other people without my knowledge. Allowing 
split permissions would essentially result in this kind of problem-
atic reality in the CFAA context. 
Given the above, a court applying the Framework would hold 
that Power did not have permission to access Facebook’s comput-
ers and therefore find CFAA unauthorized access. Even assuming 
that Power had permission to access Facebook’s computers, how-
ever, Step 3 would still dictate a finding of unauthorized access, 
as Facebook affirmatively revoked Power’s authorization by send-
ing a cease-and-desist letter and implementing an IP block. 
c) Nosal II.  First, the relevant computer—Korn/Ferry’s 
confidential database—is clearly a private computer. Second, the 
accessers (in this case, Christian, Jacobson, and, by extension, 
Nosal) at one point had permission to access these databases 
while employed by Korn/Ferry. Third, however, Korn/Ferry had 
affirmatively revoked these individuals’ access authorizations by 
terminating their login credentials upon the end of their respec-
tive employments. Thus, a court applying the Framework would 
find CFAA unauthorized access, consistent with the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s conclusion. 
As an illustration of the Framework’s application, it is worth 
considering how a court applying the Framework would adjudi-
cate this case had Nosal’s executive assistant accessed the data-
base herself (instead of providing her credentials to Nosal’s co-
conspirators) and extracted Korn/Ferry’s confidential information 
to provide to Nosal and company. In this scenario, Steps 1 and 2 
would be applied identically as compared to the actual facts—the 
computer remains private and the accesser (the executive assis-
tant, in this case) had permission to access the computer. How-
ever, Step 3 would come out differently—unlike Nosal, Christian, 
and Jacobson, the executive assistant had not had her access to 
the computer revoked, as she was still employed by Korn/Ferry. 
Thus, the court would find no CFAA unauthorized access. While 
this exposes the Framework to some of the same critiques leveled 
at the Ninth Circuit’s actual approach (namely, focusing on the 
puzzling notion that Nosal would be CFAA liable if he used the 
executive assistant’s credentials to access the database himself, 
but not if he directed the executive assistant to access the data-
base and then relay him the relevant information),135 it is 
 
 135 See, for example, Jamie L. Williams, Automation Is Not “Hacking”: Why Courts 
Must Reject Attempts to Use the CFAA as an Anti-Competitive Sword, 24 BU J Sci & Tech 
L 416, 433 (2018). 
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important to note that the executive assistant would still be sub-
ject to sanctions, whether criminal (for example, for theft of trade 
secrets) or otherwise (for example, losing her job). 
d) hiQ Labs and Pulte Homes.  Neither of these cases 
would proceed past Step 1, as both involved public computers 
(publicly available LinkedIn profiles and a publicly available 
email address, respectively). 
3. Broad-approach cases. 
a) Citrin.  A court applying the Framework would find no 
CFAA unauthorized access. First, the computer in Citrin (an  
employer-provided laptop) is clearly a private computer. Second,  
Citrin had permission to access this computer as part of his  
employment. However, at the time of the alleged unauthorized 
access (Citrin deleting data from the laptop), his employer had 
not affirmatively revoked Citrin’s access to the laptop. Thus, 
Step 3 of the Framework would dictate a finding of no CFAA un-
authorized access. 
This conclusion differs from that reached by the court in  
Citrin. However, this divergence is not overly troubling—after all, 
Citrin relied on an agency-theory justification that has been 
largely limited to the Seventh Circuit.136 
b) John.  A court applying the Framework would find no 
CFAA unauthorized access. First, the relevant computer (data-
bases containing financial institution customer information) was 
private. Second, John had permission to access this computer as 
part of her employment by Citigroup. Third, Citigroup had not, at 
the time of the relevant accesses by John, affirmatively revoked 
John’s access—thus, Step 3 would dictate a finding of no unau-
thorized access. 
Again, this conclusion departs from the holding of the decid-
ing court. Critics of the Framework will highlight such a result as 
absurd—after all, John was using company computers to further 
a criminal fraud scheme.137 From a normative perspective, it 
seems preposterous that such conduct should go unpunished. 
However, such a critique is misleading, for John would not go un-
punished. As the Fifth Circuit’s opinion made clear, John was also 
 
 136 See Lee, Note, 33 Berkeley Tech L J at 1313 (cited in note 62). 
 137 See John, 597 F3d at 269. 
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convicted by a jury on an indictment including several counts per-
taining to access-device fraud.138 
This policy point is worth emphasizing. There will certainly 
be situations in which the Framework will result in malicious ac-
tors not being punished under the CFAA’s unauthorized access 
provisions. However, one need not worry that these actors will 
escape entirely unpunished—in many such cases, those individu-
als will face other forms of criminal liability.139 Ultimately, the 
CFAA offers a legal sanction uniquely focused on unauthorized 
access, and it should not be stretched to function as a gratuitous 
sentence enhancer for all criminals whose crimes happened to  
involve a computer.140 
c) EF Cultural Travel.  Here, the relevant “computer” was 
EF’s publicly available website. Thus, Step 1 would dictate a find-
ing of no CFAA unauthorized access.141 
D. Evaluating the Framework 
The Framework is not a perfect solution to the CFAA unau-
thorized access dilemma. Though it undoubtedly advances the in-
terests underlying both the broad and narrow approaches, it still, 
in the end, represents a middle ground, and therefore entails cer-
tain compromises and tradeoffs. That being said, the Framework 
offers benefits that outweigh the interests shortchanged by its an-
alytical approach. 
1. Framework drawbacks. 
The Framework presents two drawbacks—namely, a lack of 
consideration for access purpose and the need for additional defi-
nition of certain key concepts—that, while not crippling to its vi-
ability, merit further discussion. 
 
 138 Id. 
 139 See, for example, the legal frameworks discussed in Part III.A.2. 
 140 A court applying the Framework against the facts of Rodriguez would reach simi-
lar results as those reached in applying the Framework to the facts of John. See text ac-
companying notes 51–57. 
 141 This analysis is somewhat complicated by the fact that Explorica utilized nonpub-
lic, confidential information from a former EF employee to more efficiently interpret in-
formation scraped from the site. However, this reality should not dictate an alternative 
Step 1 conclusion. Step 1 is, after all, narrowly focused on the public/private nature of the 
accessed computer (in this case, EF’s website). Instead, Explorica’s use of confidential in-
formation from the former EF employee could be addressed through mechanisms like 
trade secret law or contract claims. 
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First, the Framework removes analysis of access purpose 
from the CFAA unauthorized access inquiry. In other words, in 
considering whether X’s access of Y’s computer was authorized, 
the Framework does not consider why X accessed Y’s computer. 
As suggested above, this disregard for access purpose plays an 
important role in helping to limit the scope of conduct criminal-
ized by the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions. However, the 
removal of access purpose as a factor of consideration is not with-
out its downsides. 
Primarily, its lack of consideration for access purpose means 
that the Framework does not punish the actions of the “insider 
threat”—an individual who has permission to access a private 
computer but uses that access for purposes contrary to the com-
puter owner’s interests. So long as computer owners do not af-
firmatively revoke insiders’ authorizations, insider access of said 
computers, even for malicious purposes, would not run afoul of 
the Framework. Given large organizations’ ever-growing reliance 
on complicated information-technology infrastructures, the spec-
ter of the insider threat is a prominent one.142 In such a threat 
environment, organizations would undoubtedly prefer to have the 
CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions available to deter these 
actors. Of course, the mere fact that computer owners would pre-
fer more draconian criminal sanctions is an insufficient reason to 
adopt an expansive interpretation of CFAA liability. Moreover, as 
Part III.B illustrated, the Framework leaves computer owners 
with mechanisms like permission revocation to control access to 
their systems. 
More generally, the Framework would allow certain norma-
tively “bad” actors, like the fraudster in John or the harasser in 
Rodriguez, to go unpunished, at least by the CFAA’s unauthor-
ized access provisions. However, as noted previously, it is im-
portant to recognize the CFAA’s inherent limitations. The Act is 
not an all-purpose tool for punishing every instance of bad behav-
ior that happens to involve a computer. Other legal avenues exist 
to punish many of these bad actions.143 Moreover, under the 
Framework, a computer owner always has the prerogative to ter-
minate an objectionable use by affirmatively revoking an acces-
ser’s authorization. And finally, limiting the scope of the CFAA’s 
 
 142 See, for example, US Department of Homeland Security, National Cybersecurity 
and Communications Integration Center, Combating the Insider Threat *1–3 (May 2, 
2014), archived at https://perma.cc/77FD-SAFV. 
 143 See Part III.A.2. 
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criminal sanctions conforms with the rule of lenity, as several of 
the narrow-approach courts have noted.144 
Second, in practice, application of the Framework will re-
quire further clarification of certain key definitions (for example, 
the public/private computer distinction, the meaning of “permis-
sion,” and valid methods of affirmative revocation). In some cases, 
of course, existing case law sheds light on how these terms should 
be defined;145 however, courts will undoubtedly have to further 
parse these terms. Nonetheless, this concern should not be con-
sidered fatal to the Framework’s viability—after all, interpreting 
ambiguous terms and concepts is well within the judiciary’s insti-
tutional competencies. 
2. Framework benefits. 
The Framework offers several contributions to the existing 
case law and discourse surrounding the CFAA unauthorized ac-
cess provisions, namely: (1) advancing the interests underlying 
both the broad and narrow approaches, (2) providing a model ap-
plicable across a range of factual and technological contexts, and 
(3) offering an analytical method consistent with the CFAA’s text 
and purpose. 
First, the Framework helps to resolve the existing unauthor-
ized access circuit split in a manner that advances both the broad 
and narrow approaches’ interests. Discussion surrounding the 
unauthorized access circuit split often suggests that the two ap-
proaches—the broad approach’s purpose-based inquiry and the 
narrow approach’s permission-based inquiry—are fundamentally 
incompatible.146 However, as Parts II.B and II.C illustrated, a 
closer examination of the broad and narrow approaches indicates 
that they are driven by interests (enabling computer owners to 
better protect their computers and limiting the CFAA’s scope, re-
spectively) that are by no means mutually exclusive. Arguably, 
both the broad and narrow approaches suffer from analytical tun-
nel vision, focusing on select interests advanced by the CFAA to 
the exclusion of others. The narrow-approach courts explicitly 
levy this criticism at their broad-approach counterparts. For 
 
 144 See notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 145 See, for example, Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1068 (lending support for recognizing 
cease-and-desist letters and IP blocks as valid methods of affirmative revocation); 
Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1036 (same, but for revocation of login credentials). 
 146 See, for example, Jensen, Comment, 36 Hamline L Rev at 84–85 (cited in note 19) 
(positing an either-or choice between the broad and narrow approaches). 
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instance, the Ninth Circuit has criticized the broad-approach 
courts for focusing “only [on] the culpable behavior of the defend-
ants before them,” thereby failing to consider the larger implica-
tions of their expansive interpretation of CFAA liability.147 How-
ever, the narrow-approach courts are guilty of a similar myopia—
in their zeal to limit the CFAA’s scope, they neglect the interests 
that the broad approach’s more expansive read of the CFAA  
advances. 
Ultimately, both sides of the circuit split miss the reality that 
the interests underlying the broad and narrow approaches are, in 
fact, reconcilable—a reconciliation that the AGR Framework de-
livers. For narrow-approach advocates, the Framework offers a 
restrained conception of the CFAA unauthorized access provi-
sions’ scope. Under the Framework’s model, the statute only im-
poses liability when a private computer is involved (Step 1), and 
then only when an accesser accesses a computer that either he 
never had permission to access (Step 2) or for which his access 
permission had been affirmatively revoked (Step 3). Meanwhile, 
for broad-approach advocates, Step 3’s permission-revocation 
analysis will ensure that computer owners retain the ability to 
exert control over who has access to their systems. Admittedly, 
the Framework requires that computer owners exert this control 
in a more proactive manner than they would under the broad ap-
proach. For example, Step 3 requires that the owner affirmatively 
revoke access through a mechanism like a cease-and-desist letter, 
password revocation, or technical countermeasure, rather than by 
simply burying use prohibitions in a TOS agreement.148 Neverthe-
less, though Step 3 may require more affirmative monitoring 
from computer owners, it still provides them with a mechanism 
to ultimately control who accesses their systems.149 
Second, the Framework articulates a model that can be ap-
plied in diverse factual and technological contexts. As discussed 
in Part II.D, the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions are in-
creasingly being applied outside of the employment context in 
which they have historically been invoked. The Framework 
acknowledges this trend, providing an approach to the 
 
 147 Nosal I, 676 F3d at 862. 
 148 See Part III.B.3 for additional discussion of Step 3. 
 149 It is also worth reiterating that, even if a court’s application of the AGR Frame-
work renders the CFAA inapplicable in a given case, the computer owner can still pursue 
any number of non-CFAA remedies in response to computer-related misconduct (for ex-
ample, contract or trade secret claims). 
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unauthorized access inquiry based on concepts—public/private 
computers, permission, and affirmative revocation—that are 
largely context and technology neutral. Moreover, the Framework 
incorporates the concepts of the public/private computer distinc-
tion and affirmative revocation, both of which have surfaced in 
case law and academic commentary, but have remained largely 
ignored within the foundational cases defining the unauthorized 
access circuit split. As a result, the Framework can address a wide 
range of analytical challenges, spanning different types of fact 
patterns (both within and outside of the employment context) and 
technology scenarios (whether they be traditional database access 
cases, like Valle and Rodriguez, or more novel cases, like hiQ Labs 
and Power Ventures). 
Third, the Framework delivers the aforementioned benefits 
in a manner consistent with the CFAA’s text and purpose. As dis-
cussed in Part I.B, the CFAA’s definitions of the two terms foun-
dational to its unauthorized access provisions—“without authori-
zation” and “exceeds authorized access”—are either nonexistent 
(for the former) or largely unhelpful (for the latter). The Frame-
work remedies this gap, offering courts a simple model that syn-
thesizes concepts from post–CFAA enactment case law to flesh 
out the minimal definitional guidance offered in the CFAA’s 
text.150 The Framework is similarly consistent with the Act’s pur-
pose, regardless of which of the prevailing views regarding this 
purpose one adopts. At the broadest level, there is little doubt that 
Congress intended to construct a more robust legal regime for ad-
dressing computer crime.151 The AGR Framework, by clarifying 
core CFAA provisions, undeniably aligns with this purpose. More-
over, the AGR Framework also serves the CFAA purposes  
advocated by both sides of the present circuit split. For those who 
posit that the CFAA was intended to focus specifically on the 
 
 150 By limiting the power of computer owners to define unauthorized access, the AGR 
Framework can also be justified as helping courts to apply the principle of constitutional 
avoidance in the CFAA context. A common criticism of the broad approach is that it ren-
ders the CFAA unconstitutionally vague by (1) failing to provide individuals with suffi-
cient notice of what behavior is prohibited and (2) encouraging arbitrary and selective en-
forcement. A narrower interpretation of the CFAA, critics argue, is thus necessary in order 
to render the CFAA constitutional. See, for example, Jensen, Comment, 36 Hamline L Rev 
at 115–19 (cited in note 19). See also Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the 
CFAA as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 Harv L Rev 751, 755–57 (2013) (sum-
marizing relevant case law and academic commentary). 
 151 See, for example, S Rep No 99-432 at 2 (cited in note 13) (noting that “existing 
criminal laws are insufficient to address the problem of computer crime”). 
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computer-hacker threat,152 the AGR Framework provides a solu-
tion: Step 2 of the AGR Framework is tailored specifically to ad-
dress the hacker threat. Meanwhile, for those who argue that the 
CFAA is also meant to encompass the actions of the insider 
threat,153 Step 3 of the Framework offers a way for computer  
owners to assert control over their systems in response to such 
concerns. 
Ultimately, these benefits vastly outweigh the drawbacks 
discussed in the previous Section. For the cost of a reduced em-
phasis on access purpose and a need to flesh out some concepts, 
the Framework will offer courts an analytical model that ad-
vances the interests underlying both sides of the present circuit 
split, is adaptive to new fact patterns and technologies, and aligns 
with the statute’s text and purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
The CFAA is almost forty years old. It was passed at a time 
when the concept of computer crime was in its infancy and the 
idea of the “computer hacker” was just entering the cultural 
mainstream. Unsurprisingly, the nature of computer crime has 
evolved since then, raising questions about precisely what threats 
the CFAA is intended to address. It is this debate that has given 
rise to the present circuit split regarding what it means under the 
CFAA to access a computer “without authorization” or in a man-
ner that “exceeds authorized access.” 
This Comment provides a novel answer to that decades-old 
question. The AGR Framework offers an analytical model to re-
solve the unauthorized access circuit split, asking (1) whether the 
computer in question is publicly available or private; (2) whether 
the computer’s owner had, at any point, granted the accesser per-
mission to access the computer; and (3) whether the computer 
owner had affirmatively revoked the accesser’s permission, if any, 
prior to the purportedly unauthorized access. Ultimately, the 
Framework articulates a model that advances the interests of 
both the broad and narrow approaches—preserving computer-
system integrity and appropriately limiting the CFAA’s scope—
and is applicable across a range of factual and technological 
 
 152 For legislative materials suggesting the focus was on the computer-hacker threat, 
see HR Rep No 99-612 at 5–6 (cited in note 7); HR Rep No 98-894 at 10–11 (cited in 
note 10). 
 153 See Part III.D.1 for additional discussion of this view. 
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contexts. In this way, the Framework will help to ensure the 
CFAA unauthorized access provisions’ continued viability, 
thereby preserving one of the criminal justice system’s founda-
tional tools for combating computer crime. 
